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Motivation: A Risk-limiting audit (RLA) [2] is a post-election auditing
technique that is gaining increasing popularity, because it can automatically
correct a wrong election outcome, while being very efficient especially if the
margins are wide. The purpose of RLAs has been to strengthen public confidence
in the election, first, because they can be integrated into existing election processes,
for example, in Denmark, where the result of the first (rough) count can be verified
during the second (fine) count [3]. Second, some of the ceremonies surrounding
RLAs can be turned into public events, such as the dice-rolling ceremony used
to create entropy to select a random sample.
The question, however, remains open, whether RLAs really strengthen public
confidence. While the theory behind the audits is sound, the resulting sample
size is often very small (e.g. 523 ballots audited in an RLA given a total of
393,826 cast votes in the 2020 election in Denver, Colorado). Thus it remains an
open question whether the voters would find an audit with such a sample size
convincing or not.
Method: To answer the research question if RLAs really strengthen public
confidence in the outcome of an election, we conducted a user study with 105
randomly chosen US residents across all demographics using the Prolific platform.
We study several hypothesis, most importantly:1:
H1,1 When asked about their opinions about which number of ballots should be
selected for auditing, the participants provide a number higher than the one
prescribed by the RLA methodology.
H1,2 Participants’ confidence in the audit results changes when they are informed
about the number of ballots selected for auditing
Results: When asked which number of ballots the participants would prefer
to be audited, this number tended to be magnitudes higher than the actual
number required by the RLA for most of the participants (see Figure 1). The sign
test has confirmed that the difference between preferred and actual number of
ballots is significantly different from zero (p < .001, 95% CI for median difference
between preferred and actual ballots (as percentage of total ballots) is [3.23%,
16.1%]), thus, H1,1 is confirmed.
While the majority of the participants (70%, 74 out of 105) had a positive
attitude towards conducting RLAs, choosing either “maybe yes” or “definitely
1 For a more detailed description of the methodology and the rest of tested hypotheses
and conducted analyses, see the extended version of the paper [1]
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yes” as the answer to the question whether their confidence in the election result
would increase after an RLA, only 44% provided a positive answer to the same
question asked after presenting the number of audited ballots to the participants.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of changes of participants’ answers. The Wilcoxon
signed-rank test shows a significant difference between the “before” and “after”
answers (p < .001, Z = −4.47, effect size r = .33, moderate), thus, H1,2 is
confirmed.
Fig. 1: Left: Preferred vs. actual number audited ballots (as percentage of total
ballots) depending on the margin. The scale is logarithmic. Right: Percentage of
participants for each case of confidence change.
Conclusion: We recognize the value of RLAs in confirming the integrity of
the election result. However, our results show that as a measure to create trust,
they are not sufficient by themselves, and additional measures such as voter
education need to be considered. While this study is the first one to investigate
this issue, follow-up work is needed to better understand the factors influencing
voter’s trust and the effectiveness of various ways one can educate voters about
RLAs or raise trust via other measures.
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